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1. Introduction
The market for academic journals is in a state of flux. Library subscription fees, the
chief source of revenue for commercial academic publishers, have been rising in
real terms over the past several decades (McCabe 2002, Dewatripont et al. 2006)
to the point that commercial journals’ prices are an order of magnitude higher
than non-profits’ (Bergstrom 2001, Dewatripont et al. 2006). At the same time,
new technologies, including digitization and the Internet, hold out the possibility
of revolutionizing academic journals along with all other forms of media. These
new technologies will certainly alter the cost structure of academic journals, with
ramifications for pricing, market structure, and even the very essence of what
academic journals are.
The market for academic journals is important to study. Prices have risen to
the point at which libraries are beginning to cancel significant titles (Weiss 2003),
suggesting the possibility for significant deadweight loss. The deadweight loss
may felt by readers who lose access to significant scholarship and authors whose
articles’ impact and citations are diminished. Since journals are a channel for
dissemination of knowledge in the economy, frictions in this channel may have
much broader implications for the economy as a whole.1
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework for understanding the impact
of the digital revolution on journal prices, quality, and market structure. The key
feature of the journals market captured in our framework is its “two-sided” nature.
Subscribers on one side of the market benefit from the scholarship of authors on
the other side. Conversely, authors benefit from having a large number of readers.
Journals serve as intermediaries between the two sides.
Drawing on the growing industrial-organization literature on two-sided markets, we develop a model tailored to the case of academic journals.2 The model
captures three unique features of the journal market. First, while readers can
subscribe to many journals simultaneously, authors can only publish an article in
one. In the parlance of the two-sided-markets literature, authors “singlehome” and
readers “multihome.” Second, journals bundle a number of articles together in a
1
Another reason for analyzing the journals market for an academic audience is that it is one
of the few markets that academics participate in as producers and consumers and exercise some
control over as journal founders and editors.
2
The literature on two-sided markets includes Ambrus and Argenziano (2005); Armstrong
(2006); Baye and Morgan (2001); Caillaud and Jullien (2003); Evans (2003); Hagiu (2006a,
2006b); Hermalin and Katz (2004); Jeon, Laffont, and Tirole (2004); Laffont et al. (2001);
Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003, 2006); Schmalensee (2002); and Wright (2004a, 2004b).
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single issue. Our model endogenizes bundling (we will see this is a way to economize on the fixed cost of serving a reader). Third, articles may vary in quality.
Although for simplicity we take articles to be of homogeneous quality in the basic
variant of the model, we allow for heterogeneous article quality in an extension
in Section 5.4. In that extension, readers prefer high quality articles and authors
wish to be certified by a high-quality journal as indexed by the average quality of
articles it publishes.
We use the model to understand how the traditional structure of academic
journal prices, with zero or low author fees on one side and high subscription
fees on the other, might have arisen. We analyze how a change in the structure
of journal costs due to digital technologies may change the structure of journal
prices. We study the efficiency and competitive viability of a new model of journal
pricing, open access, advocated by a growing number of scholars and librarians.
The open-access model turns the traditional pricing model on its head, making
articles freely available to readers over the Internet and deriving revenues instead
from high author fees. We explore how the market structure of journals may evolve
in response to entry and competition. Will one journal emerge that serves as a
centralized intermediary between all authors and readers, or will niche journals
emerge serving different segments of the market? How does the answer depend
on costs and author- and reader-demand conditions?
The analysis begins in Section 3 with the monopoly case. The analysis shows
that a monopoly journal has no inherent reason to favor either authors or readers
in its pricing. The monopolist is interested in extracting revenue from all possible
sources. One side of the market would obtain relatively favorable prices only if
there is a great deal of asymmetry between author and reader benefits or costs.
For example, the monopolist may charge low or zero fees (open access) to readers
if benefits on the author side of the market are much greater than on the reader
side. Conversely, the monopolist may charge low or zero submission fees if the
benefits on the reader side dominate those on the author side.
As shown in our analysis of free-entry equilibrium in Section 4, competition
changes matters. The fact that authors “singlehome” while readers “multihome”
leads competition to be relatively tougher for authors than for readers. Readers
cannot freely substitute across journals because each has an effective monopoly
over the articles published there. If the journal’s fixed cost of serving an additional
reader (denoted cR , distinct from the transaction cost of delivering a single article to
a single reader, denoted c) is low enough, then in equilibrium there is a proliferation
of journals that are each targeted to authors of particular types. Different journals
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may offer different points on the submission-fee/readership-size frontier. On the
other hand, if cR is sufficiently high, a few—or in the extreme one—journal may
publish all articles, since having few journals economizes on the duplication of
fixed reader costs. The pressure of potential entrants keeps the submission fee low,
in many instances reducing it to zero. The model thus provides an explanation
of why author fees over the previous several decades—essentially a print-journal
environment in which cR is high—have generally been low, and thus a much less
important source of revenue than subscription fees. To the extent that new digital
technologies can be expected to reduce cR , one can expect an expansion of entering
journals into various price-point/quality niches.
In related literature, the most comprehensive treatment of new policy issues
facing the academic-journals market in the digital age is Dewatripoint (2006),
which also contains a detailed empirical analysis of pricing trends. Besides our
own previous work,3 the existing theoretical literature on academic journals, including McCabe (2004) and Jeon and Menicucci (2006), takes as given that the
only source of revenue is library subscription fees, and thus cannot be used to
analyze the division of fees across authors and readers that the present paper’s
two-sided-market model can.
The present paper contributes to the industrial-organization literature on twosided markets by being the first analysis of free-entry equilibrium among homogeneous platforms. Most of the literature on competition in two-sided markets
considers competition between at most two platforms, and the two platforms are
generally assumed to be differentiated (e.g., Armstrong 2006, Rochet and Tirole
2003, Rochet and Tirole 2006). Exceptions that are closer to our work include
Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Ambrus and Argenziano (2005), and Hagiu (2006b).
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) analyze Bertrand competition among two homogeneous
platforms, but the imperfect matchmaking technology assumed in their model effectively leads to imperfect competition between them. Ambrus and Argenziano
(2005) analyze homogeneous duopoly platforms. The partition equilibria we derive
3

McCabe and Snyder (2006) is an ancillary paper that analyzes the alternative modeling assumption of lump-sum prices rather than per-reader or per-article prices assumed here. Equilibria
are much harder to characterize in that ancillary paper, and many results have to be stated as possibility results, proved with numerical examples. Another difference is that McCabe and Snyder
(2006) does not analyze free-entry equilibrium. McCabe and Snyder (2005) sketches the analysis
of a model in which talented editors weed out bad papers that are costly for subscribers to read
but provide no benefits. The analysis is less general than in the present paper, only analyzing
the case of monopoly under the assumption that authors have homogeneous valuations, essentially
removing the author side of the market from the analysis.
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in Proposition 2 is a generalization to an arbitrary number of platforms of the asymmetric equilibria they derive for two platforms. Hagiu (2006b) analyzes free entry
among homogeneous platforms. The simple structure of costs and the additive nature of consumer heterogeneity leads to a unique free-entry equilibrium in which a
single platform charges both sides a price equal to marginal cost (zero). He shows
that free entry may be less efficient than even monopoly because prices do not
reflect indirect network benefits from each side of the market. Our setting—with
both fixed and marginal costs and with multiplicative consumer heterogeneity—is
sufficiently more complicated that characterizing free-entry equilibrium presents a
challenge. We show that free-entry equilibria are generally inefficient but are not
able to derive a comparison of the relative efficiency of monopoly and free entry.
The extension to heterogeneous article quality in Section 5.4 is one of the first
two-sided-markets papers to incorporate quality. Lerner and Tirole (2006) construct a model in which standard-setting organizations are intermediaries between
technology sponsors and end users. Intermediaries obtain perfect signals of the
value to end users of submitted technologies and choose whether or not to certify
the technologies as being good or bad for end users. Our model differs in that certification is not zero-one but is given by the average quality of published articles;
in addition, our intermediaries are profit-maximizing and can commit to a quality
threshold. In Morrison and White (2004), intermediaries are regulators that license
banks as being sound or unsound. Regulators in different countries differ in the
prior probability that they have a viable screening technology. Their model differs
from ours in that their intermediaries are benevolent and do not charge licensing
fees. Therefore, the central question in our analysis—the level of access prices on
the two sides of the market—is not an issue in their paper.
Our monopoly analysis is for a slightly different variant than covered by the
general analyses of Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006). However, the conclusions are similar (in particular, see Rochet and Tirole 2003). Our
analysis of mononpoly in Section 3 will thus be brief, and most of our attention
devoted to the new analysis of free-entry equilibrium in Section 4.

2. Model
The model has three types of economic agents: journals, authors, and readers.
Journals are intermediaries between authors and readers. Journals acquire articles
from authors, bundle them into an issue, and distribute them to subscribing readers.
The journal expends fixed cost cA for each article it publishes, reflecting the cost of
4

processing the article (refereeing, copy editing, typesetting, etc.) and of servicing
the author’s account. The cost of distributing the issue to a single reader includes
a fixed cost cR plus a variable cost c per article in the issue. The fixed cost
cR includes the cost of servicing the reader’s account and any fixed shipping
and handling costs. The remaining variable shipping costs, including bandwidth
charges for the case of electronic distribution, are embodied in c.
Each author is endowed with a single article. Author i obtains a benefit bA
i per
reader. This term embodies a number of potential benefits. The author may obtain
pure enjoyment from being read by an additional reader. Having more readers
also enhances an author’s career prospects through better name recognition and
increased citations, both used as measures for evaluating author talent in hiring,
tenure, and promotion decisions. Assume bA
i is a continuous random variable
A
A
having distribution function F , density f , and support [0, b̄A ]. Normalize the
mass of authors to unity.
Reader k obtains benefit bR
k per article read. This term embodies the benefit
the reader obtains from the information contained in the article. The reader can
read as many articles as he likes from the journals to which he subscribes. Assume
R
R
bR
k is a continuous random variable having distribution function F , density f ,
R
and support [0, b̄ ]. Normalize the mass of readers to unity.
Note we have assumed a fair degree of homogeneity. There are no exogeneous
differences among journals. They have identical costs. They may differ in quality
but only to the extent they publish different numbers of articles or have different
numbers of readers, not in the quality of the articles published nor in the value
added in selecting or editing them. Authors differ in the benefits they gain from
publishing their articles, but their articles provide identical benefits to readers.
That is, articles are of a similar quality.4 Readers differ in the benefits they gain
from reading a given article, but having the article read provides the same benefit
to an author regardless of who is doing the reading. We have also assumed a fair
degree of linearity. An author’s benefit is linear in the number of readers of his
article. A reader’s benefit is linear in the number of articles he reads.
4

A natural question arising in this simple model regards why journals exist in the first place.
Why do authors not circumvent the intermediary and circulate their articles directly to readers?
First, bundling articles in a journal economizes on the fixed cost, cR , of serving readers. If
cR > 0, it would be prohibitively expensive for the infinitesimal authors to circulate their articles
directly to the infinitesimal readers. Second, even if cR = 0, readers may not be able to distiguish
between scholarly and non-scholarly material without paying a small cost, and journals may be an
economical way of providing that service. Third, as modeled in Section 5.4, a function of journals
may be to certify article quality.
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Submission fees will be specified on a per-reader basis and subscription fees
on a per-article basis.5 In particular, we assume journal j charges each author a
R
per-reader submission fee pA
j times the number of subscribers to journal j, nj ,
A R 6
for a total submission fee of pj nj . The journal charges each reader a per-article
A
subscription fee of pR
j times the number of articles published by the journal, nj ,
R A 7, 8
for a total subscription fee of pj nj .
We will impose several additional constraints on the model reflecting industry
R
practice. We will constrain prices pA
j and pj to be non-negative. Journals may
subsidize authors and readers, in that prices may be set below marginal cost,
but journals cannot make explicit cash transfers to authors or readers. Following
5
The results in two-sided-market models are generally sensitive to the assumption of pertransaction or fixed fees. See Rochet and Tirole (2006) for one of the first general analyses
incorporating both types of fees.
There are several reasons for specifying prices on a per-reader or per-article basis. First, the
assumption reflects the long-run-equilibrium perspective that journals can adjust author prices as
the number of readers changes and reader prices as the number of articles changes. This perspective
is supported by empirical analysis, available on request from the authors, of a panel of for-profit
business and economics journals over the period 1988–2000. Fixed-effects regressions show a
positive and statistically-significant relationship between library subscription fees for a journal
and the number of articles it publishes in a year. This result holds in ordinary least squares as
well as two-stage least squares specifications, in which articles and citations are instrumented
with lagged values of these variables. Second, when prices are specified on a per-reader or perarticle basis, as discussed in footnote 9, implausible equilibria can be eliminated with the standard
refinement of weakly undominated strategies. If prices are instead specified as lump sum, more
esoteric refinements such as Ambrus’ (2006) coalitional rationalizability are needed to eliminate
implausible equilibria. Third, in realistic extensions considered in Section 5.4 in which an author
benefits from the journal’s reputation as measured by the average quality of articles published
there, specification of author fees as per-reader or lump-sum turns out to be equivalent. Fourth,
the alternative assumption of lump-sum prices is analyzed in an ancillary paper, McCabe and
Snyder (2006). The pricing assumption adopted in the present paper allows us to derive a general,
analytical characterization of competitive equilibrium rather than being forced to rely on numerical
examples as in the ancillary paper.
6
Since all articles are of equal quality, it makes no difference whether pA
j is taken to be a
submission fee or a fee paid conditional on acceptance since all submitted articles are published.
7
Equivalently, the subscription fee can be thought of as a function of the number of articles a
subscriber actually reads. With linear benefits and fees per article read, a reader who reads any
article in a journal reads all of them.
8
The implicit assumption is that the journal acquires authors and readers simultaneously. Given
the assumption of per-transaction prices and the refinement of weakly undominated strategies, the
results would be the same if the journal acquired authors and then readers sequentially. See Hagiu
(2006a) for an analysis of the sequential variant when the platform’s ability to commit to prices is
in question.
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industry practice, an author is assumed to be able to publish his article in only one
journal, i.e., journals sign exclusive contracts with authors. On the other hand,
readers may subscribe to multiple journals.
Players’ objective functions are as follows. Journal j’s profit is
R
A
R A R
A
R
(pA
j nj )nj + (pj nj )nj − TC(nj , nj )

(1)

R
where TC(nA
j , nj ) is the total cost function
R
A A
R R
A R
TC(nA
j , nj ) = c nj + c nj + cnj nj .

(2)

If author i submits his article to journal j, he obtains net surplus
A
A
nR
j (bi − pj ).

(3)

Author i will submit his article to the journal j providing the highest surplus (3)
as long as this surplus is positive. If (3) is negative for all j, he will not submit his
article to any journal. If reader k subscribes to journal j, he obtains net surplus
R
R
nA
j (bk − pj ).

(4)

Since readers can subscribe to multiple journals simultaneously, reader k will
subscribe to any journal j for which (4) is non-negative.
In the next several sections, we will analyze market structures for journals
ranging from monopoly to free entry. The next section starts with the simplest
market structure, monopoly, allowing us to develop the model further in this simple
setting.

3. Monopoly
R
A single, profit-maximizing monopoly journal j sets prices pA
j and pj . Author
i submits his article to the journal if his surplus given in expression (3) is nonA
negative, or, rearranging, if bA
i ≥ pj . Author demand for the journal is thus
A A
R
R R 9
nA
j = 1 − F (pj ). Similarly, reader demand is nj = 1 − F (pj ).
9

The equations for author and reader demand implicitly rule out the possibility that the market
breaks down, with each side of the market anticipating no one on the other side will participate.
The refinement of weakly undominated strategies, which we will adopt throughout the paper, is
sufficient to rule out market breakdown and ensure that the stated equations uniquely represent
demand. To see this, take the example of author demand. Given that author prices are specified
as per-reader, it is a weakly dominant strategy for authors to submit to a monopoly journal as long
as his net benefit per reader is positive. If no readers subscribe, the author pays nothing so is no
worse off than if he did not submit. If a positive measure of readers subscribe, the author gains
more from submitting than not.

7

The first-order condition from maximization of journal profit (1) with respect
to pA
j , for example, is
dnA
dnA
j R A
j
R
A R
A
n
(p
+
p
)
+
n
n
−
MC
= 0,
j
j
j
j j
A
dpA
dp
j
j

(5)

R
A
A
R
where MCA = dTC(nA
j , nj )/dnj = c + cnj is the marginal author cost. The
first-order condition can be rearranged in the form of a Lerner index:
A
A
R R
nR
nA
1
j pj − MC
j nj pj
= A − A R A,
L ≡
A
nR
|j | nj nj pj
j pj
A

(6)

A
A
A
A
where A
j ≡ (dnj /dpj )(pj /nj ) is the own-price elasticity of author demand. The
A
Lerner index LA is defined to be the percentage markup of the total author fee nR
j pj
over marginal cost MCA . Equation (6) characterizes the monopoly price as long as
the constraint pA
j ≥ 0 does not bind; if (6) would imply a negative price, then the
=
0. The corresponding first-order condition and expression for the
solution is pA
j
Lerner index for reader price pR
j are analogous, simply interchanging superscripts.
Equation (6) implies that the journal prices as would a multiproduct monopolist
producing complementary goods, here, authors and readers. The journal shades
A
the submission fee nR
j pj down somewhat from the single-product Lerner index
formula to take account of the effect that increasing the number of articles increases
the number of readers, on whom the journal may earn a margin. Similar reasoning
R
holds for the subscription fee nA
j pj . The greater is the revenue earned from readers,
R R
A R A
nA
j nj pj , relative to that earned from authors, nj nj pj , the more the journal gains
from subsidizing authors to increase reader demand.
Equation (6) indicates that a monopoly journal may charge strictly positive
prices for both authors and readers. This will indeed be the case if both sides
of the market are symmetric or nearly so. Charging positive prices allows the
monopolist to extract surplus from both sides of the market. For the monopolist to
wish to charge a non-positive price to one side of the market, the two sides of the
market must be sufficiently asymmetric. The monopolist would then subsidize the
low-value side of the market in order to extract more surplus from the high-value
side. Open access will thus only emerge in equilibrium with a monopoly journal if
the author side of the market is sufficiently high-value relative to the reader side.
If the two sides are perfectly symmetric, a monopolist would never adopt open
access. This is true even if readers are costless to serve (cR = c = 0) because of
the Internet or other technology.
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An example demonstrates the possibility that a monopolist will set a zero price
on one side of the market if the two sides are sufficiently asymmetric. Suppose
A
R
cA = cR = c = 0.1, bA
i is uniformly distributed on [0, b̄ ], and bk is uniformly
R
A
R
distributed on [0, b̄ ]. If b̄ = b̄ = 1, then the equilibrium monopoly prices
R
are pA
j = pj = 0.43, monopoly profit is 0.13, and social welfare is 0.32. As
A
b̄ is increased above a threshold of 2.5, the monopoly switches from charging
R
both positive prices to open access (i.e., pR
j = 0). If c is reduced from 0.1 to
0 (perhaps capturing Internet distribution), the threshold value of b̄A above which
the monopoly journal adopts open access falls from 2.5 to 2.
To judge the efficiency of the monopoly outcome, it can be compared to the
second best, i.e., the outcome maximizing the sum of consumer and producer
surplus subject to a break-even constraint for the journal. We will omit the details,
referring the reader to similar analysis in Sections 2.2 and 5 of Rochet and Tirole
(2003). The main finding is that, while the overall price level may be lower in
the second best, the structure of author relative to reader prices can be similar
between the second best and monopoly equilibrium. If author and reader sides of
the market are symmetric, author and reader prices will be equal in the second best,
just as in the monopoly equilibrium. For prices to be unequal, there has to be some
asymmetry between the two sides. For example, for open access to be socially
efficient, it is still necessary for the author side to be sufficiently important. In
the second best, “importance” is measured by both the relative revenue generated
by the side of the market in question as well as the relative consumer surplus that
flows as a positive externality from the other side of the market. Analogously,
for free submission to be socially efficient, the reader side must be sufficiently
important.
Return to the numerical example introduced in this section with cA = cR = c =
R
A
R
0.1, and with bA
i and bk uniformly distributed on [0, b̄ ] and [0, b̄ ], respectively.
R
A
If b̄A = b̄R = 1, second-best prices are pA
j = pj = 0.17. As b̄ is increased above
a threshold of 1.4, the second best switches from both positive prices to open
access. While second-best prices are lower than monopoly prices, and while the
threshold for open access is lower, the numerical example shows that prices in the
second best and the monopoly equilibrium can have a similar relative structure.

4. Free Entry
In this section, we analyze equilibrium when homogeneous journals can freely enter. This case is important to analyze for two reasons. First, it will complement the
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monopoly analysis from the previous section, providing the other extreme of a continuum of market structures. The case of moderate competition between a limited
number of differentiated journals could be expected to fall somewhere in between.
Second, while reputational capital and the complicated bundling strategies may
serve to differentiate incumbent journals and raise entry barriers in the short run
(Dewatripont et al. 2006), there is enough evidence of long-run movements in the
journal market that the case of free entry is worth considering.10,11
Suppose there are an unlimited number of homogeneous journals that are potential entrants in the market. Journals have no fixed entry costs, though as
before they have fixed costs cA of serving authors and cR of serving readers. Let
j = 1, . . . , J index active journals, i.e., journals serving a positive mass of each of
R
authors and readers. Active journals set prices pA
j and pj simultaneously. A freeentry equilibrium is an author/reader price pair for each active journal satisfying
two properties: first, each active journal earns non-negative profit and, second, no
inactive journal can choose prices that would allow it to enter and earn positive
profit.12
Recall the assumption from Section 2 that while readers can subscribe to multiple journals, authors must choose a single journal to which to submit. In the
parlance of the two-sided-markets literature, authors singlehome and readers multihome. This asymmetry between the two sides of the market will play a key role
in the analysis of free-entry equilibrium, as it did in the analyses of competing
platforms in Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006). Journals
compete aggressively for authors since authors can only sign up with one journal.
Journals do not similarly compete for readers. A reader will subscribe to any
journal j for which his surplus, equation (4), is non-negative, a condition which
is independent of other journals’ prices or quantity of authors or readers.
Journals compete for authors by charging low author prices (providing authors
with a direct benefit) and low reader prices (providing authors with an indirect
10
The Berkeley Electronic Press has created twelve new series; the American Economic Association is developing four new field journals; the Journal of the European Economic Association
was created by a wholesale movement of editors from the European Economic Review after a
dispute with the publisher; McCabe and Snyder (2006) document 22 new, refereed, open-access
journals in the fields of economics and business.
11
Capital requirements may be relatively lower for journals than many other markets. Even if it
is argued that other capital requirements are substantial, external sources of revenue, discussed in
Section 5.3, may be available to subsidize entry.
12
This equilibrium concept is related to Baumol, Panzar, and Willig’s (1982) contestable market.
The difference is that their one-sided market setting, all active firms necessarily shared the same
price vector, whereas two active journals can have two different price vectors in our setting.
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benefit through the increase in the number of readers). Competition in free-entry
equilibrium is intense, dissipating all potential profits, as the following proposition
states. The proof of Proposition 1 and all subsequent propositions is provided in
the Appendix.
Proposition 1. In a free-entry equilibrium, each journal earns zero profit.
In any outcome in which a journal j earns positive profit, there is a potential
entrant willing to undercut j’s prices slightly, thereby capturing all of j’s demand
and almost all of j’s profit for itself. If pA
j > 0, the entrant can capture j’s authors
A
A
directly by undercutting pj slightly. If pj = 0, the entrant cannot undercut pA
j since
R
negative prices are not allowed. The entrant can undercut pj slightly, providing a
larger readership than j and thus making the journal more attractive to authors.
The next three propositions provide a characterization of free-entry equilibrium
for various configurations of the cost parameters. Proposition 2 treats the case in
which cR > 0. Economies of scale in bundling articles arise when cR > 0. Fixing
the number of articles a reader reads, the fewer journals the articles are divided
among, the fewer times the fixed reader cost cR needs to be expended. Thus, since
the support of author and reader types are bounded (by b̄A and b̄R , respectively)
there will be a finite number of active journals in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 shows that these active journals partition the space of authors
and readers. The proof of the proposition begins with a lemma (Lemma 1), which
works out the details of the argument that no two active journals can charge the
same pair of author-reader prices if cR > 0. Otherwise a journal could enter,
slightly undercut one or the other price, capture the two journals’ demand, but
economize on cost because the authors would be collected in a single journal so
only one fixed cost cR per reader would have to be expended per reader rather than
two. Thus active journals must charge different prices; in particular, considering
any two journals, one must charge a higher author price and a lower reader price
than the other. If not, one of the two journals would have to be charging higher
prices to both authors and readers, and this journal would obtain no demand.
It follows that if cR > 0, the J active journals can be ordered beginning with
the one charging the highest author price but lowest reader price at one extreme
(labeled journal 1), down to the journal charging the lowest author price but highest
reader price (labeled journal J ). Journal 1 serves the most readers since it has the
lowest reader price. It serves the interval of the highest-value authors since they
have the highest marginal rate of substitution between readers and fees. If these
highest-value authors would not submit to journal 1, no author types would, and
journal 1 would be inactive. As the journal index j increases, lower intervals of
11

author types are served and smaller numbers of readers are served. If J > 1, some
readers end up subscribing to several journals. A reader who subscribes to journal
j also subscribes to journals 1, 2, . . . , j − 1. Formally, we have the following
proposition.13
Proposition 2. Suppose cR > 0. In a free-entry equilibrium, there exists an
ordering of the n ≥ 0 active journals j = 1, . . . , J , a partition of author types
A
0 ≤ BJA < BJ−1
< · · · < B2A < B1A < B0A = b̄A ,

(7)

and a partition of reader types
R
< BJR < b̄R
0 ≤ B1R < B2R < · · · < BJ−1

(8)

A
such that journal j serves all author types in the interval (BjA , Bj−1
) and all
R R
reader types in the interval (Bj , b̄ ]. Author prices are strictly decreasing and
A
reader prices are strictly increasing in index j: for all j = 1, . . . , n, pA
j < pj−1
R
R
and pj > pj−1 .

Proposition 2 implies that if cR > 0, there will be at most one open-access
journal. It would serve the most readers of any journal since of course all readers
would subscribe. It would serve the authors who care the most about wide dissemination. Symmetrically, the proposition implies that there will be at most one
free-submission journal, serving the interval of authors who care the least about
wide dissemination, subscribed to by only an interval of the highest-value readers.
If cR = 0, economies of scale in bundling articles disappears. Competition
to capture each author type leads to niche journals. Each niche journal tailors its
combination of author fees and readership (which depends in turn on reader fees)
to maximize each author type’s utility subject to a break-even constraint for the
journal.
Proposition 3. Suppose cR = 0. Each author type bA
i that is served is charged
R A
)
and
p
(b
)
maximizing
this
type’s
gross
surplus subject to a breakprices pA (bA
i
i
13

Technically, Propositions 2 and 3 do not need to hold on sets of author/reader types of zero
measure. We omit the modifier “for almost all types” to make the propositions more succinct, but
the proofs incorporate this technicality.
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even constraint for the journal:
⎧


R R
A
R
argmax
(p
)](b
+
p
−
c)
[1
−
F
⎪
j
i
j
⎪
⎨
pR
j
R A

p (bi ) =
cA
⎪
R
⎪
+c
subject
to
p
∈
0,
⎩
j
1 − F R(pR
j )
pA (bA
i ) =

cA
+ c − pR (bA
i ).
1 − F R(pR (bA
))
i

(9)

(10)

R A
Intervals of author types over which pA (bA
i ) and p (bi ) vary are served by a
continuum of journals, and intervals over which these prices are constant are
served by an indeterminate number of journals (any number between zero and a
continuum). Author type bA
i is served if and only if
A
R A
A
[1 − F R(pR (bA
i ))][bi + p (bi ) − c] ≥ c .

(11)

It is easy to characterize the special case of costless journal production. The
following proposition is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. Suppose cA = cR = c = 0. The number of active journals is
indeterminate: there can be any number between one and a continuum. Active
R
journals charge the same prices pA
j = pj = 0. All authors and readers are served.
Propositions 3 is related to Proposition 2, showing what happens to the results
in Proposition 2 in the limit as cR → 0. The number of active journals increases,
providing an increasingly fine partition of author types that are increasingly well
tailored to the preferences of each individual author.
Return to the numerical example from Section 3 in which cA = cR = c = 0.1
R
and bA
i and bk are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. This parameter configuration
is covered by Proposition 2. Figure 1 depicts the free-entry equilibria. There
is a continuum of equilibria, all involving one active journal. The equilibria
range from an author/reader pair of (0.00, 0.35) (note involving free submission)
to (0.20, 0.14). A grid search revealed no equilibria for these parameters with two
active journals.
If all the parameters in this numerical example are kept the same but cR is
reduced from 0.1 to 0, then Proposition 3 applies. A continuum of journals
operates with equilibrium prices given in Figure 2. To show the full range of
possibilities, the figure also expands the support of author types by taking bA
i
to be uniformly distributed on [0, 2] rather than [0, 1]. The journals serving the
13
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Figure 1: Set of free-entry equilibria in numerical example with cA = cR = c = 0.1 and bA
i and
uniformly
distributed
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Figure 2: Free-entry equilibrium in numerical example with cA = c = 0.1, cR = 0, bA
i uniformly
R
distributed on [0, 2], and bk uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Involves a continuum of journals.
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lowest-value authors adopt free submission and high reader fees. The number of
such journals is indeterminate, any number between one and a continuum. Journals
serving intermediate types charge positive prices to both authors and readers. There
are a continuum of different journals in this range. Journals serving the highest
author types adopt open access, deriving their revenue from high submission fees.
Again, the number of such journals is indeterminate.
Figure 2 depicts a case in which the free-entry equilibrium involves some
open-access journals. Journals serving authors with types bA
i ≥ 1.1 offer free
subscriptions. Proposition 5 provides additional sufficient conditions for open
access to emerge in equilibrium. Before presenting the proposition, some notation
A
A
is an
is in order. Recall author types bA
i are contained in [0, b̄ ], implying b̄
A
upper bound on author types. Let b be the greatest lower bound on the support
¯
of author types (this will exceed 0 if types in [0, bA ] have zero measure).
¯
Proposition 5. The following are alternative sets of sufficient conditions for some
journal to adopt open access in the free-entry equilibrium.
Set (i): cA = cR = c = 0.
Set (ii): cR > 0 and

b > c + c + c + max
R
¯
pR
j ∈[0,b̄ ]
A

A

R

pR
j

1
η R (pR
j )

−1

,

(12)

R R R
R R
where η R (pR
j ) = pj f (pj )/[1 − F (pj )] is the absolute value of the elasticity of reader demand.

Set (iii): cR = 0 and
b̄A > c + max

x∈[0,b̄R ]

[1 − F R(x)]x
F R(x)

.

(13)

We already saw the sufficient conditions in set (i) in Proposition 4. The intuition behind the sufficient conditions in set (ii) is that if authors have sufficiently
high values for readers, they would always be willing to switch to an entrant charging a higher author price but a lower reader price (thus having greater readership)
unless these authors were presently served by an open-access journal, which maximizes readership. Set (iii) is a sufficient condition for the maximization program
(9) to have the solution pR (bA
i ) = 0 for author types in a neighborhood of the
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highest value, b̄A . If so, this neighborhood of high-value authors would be served
by an open-access journal or journals.
To measure the social efficiency of free-entry equilibrium, we will analyze a
variant of the second best, namely the second best with J active journals, where
J is set to maximize social welfare subject to all active journals’ breaking even.
Free-entry equilibria are generally fall short of this benchmark. For example,
consider the numerical example in Figure 1. One of these equilibria, the one
with author-reader price vector (0.17, 0.17), is second-best efficient conditional on
there being one active journal. However, social welfare is 38 percent higher in the
second-best outcome with two active journals. Two journals can better serve the
range of author and reader types than one. This second-best outcome with two
journals is not a free-entry equilibrium because it is vulnerable to entry.
Free-entry equilibrium in the case in which cR = 0 are not generally secondbest efficient either. While the number of active journals (a continuum) is efficient,
their prices generally are not. The prices are set to maximize the targeted author’s
consumer surplus and do not directly take into account the consumer surplus of
readers. Consider the numerical example in Figure 2. It is second-best efficient
for authors of types bA
i ∈ [0.2, 2.0] to be served by open-access journals. They
could be charged high enough author prices to subsidize zero reader prices and
still have the journals break even. However, as the figure shows, the free-entry
equilibrium does not involve open access for bA
i ∈ [0.20, 1.09].
Our results on the inefficiency of free-entry equilibrium echoes Hagiu (2006).
In a simpler setting with additive consumer heterogeneity and zero costs, Hagiu
shows that free-entry equilibrium may be less efficient even than monopoly.

5. Extensions
In this section, we will extend the basic analysis in several directions to try to
capture some further institutional details of the journal market in practice.

5.1. Endogenous Reader Cost
The analysis so far has taken the cost structure as given. In practice, costs may
depend on the pricing regime. In particular, open access frees the journal from
having to keep track of readers and process their accounts, leading to lower reader
costs. Indeed, in an online-journal environment, open access can eliminate fixed
reader costs entirely (in a print-journal environment, delivering the physical copy
to the reader may still involve a fixed cost).
16

We will model the possibility that open access reduces fixed reader costs in
the following way.14 We will continue to take cost parameters cA and c as given
but suppose that the fixed reader cost depends on the pricing regime, equaling
R
cR > 0 if pR
j > 0 and 0 if pj = 0. That is, the journal has to pay the fixed
cost of creating and processing a reader’s account if it wants to collect fees from
him. This specification does not rule out the possibility that Internet distribution
involves bandwidth costs, which would appear as a positive cost per download
c > 0 independent of the number of readers who are doing downloading.
It is clear that endogenizing costs in this way increases the range of parameters
for which open access would emerge with a monopoly, in the second best, and in
free-entry equilibrium. The next proposition provides sufficient conditions under
which open access emerges in free-entry equilibrium with endogenous costs as
modeled in this section.
Proposition 6. Suppose adopting open access reduces the fixed reader costs from
cR > 0 to 0. If (13) holds, some journal adopts open access in free-entry equilibrium.
The proof is immediate from Proposition 5. By Proposition 5, condition (13)
ensures that some journal adopts open access in free-entry equilibrium for cR = 0.
But if costs are endogeneous as modeled here, cR = 0 is indeed the relevant
reader fixed cost for an open-access journal, so (13) is still the relevant condition
guaranteeing open access. It should be emphasized that Proposition 6 provides
sufficient conditions for open access; open access may emerge when costs are
endogeneous in a broader range of cases as well.
Endogenizing cost may have a substantial effect on the propensity to adopt open
access. Returning to the numerical example in which cA = cR = c = 0.1 and and
R
bA
i and bk are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], Figure 1 shows that if costs are not
endogeneous, none of the range of equilibria with one active journal exhibit open
access. If endogeneous costs are added to this example—i.e., if adopting open
access is assumed to reduce cR from 0.1 to 0—it can be shown using a grid search
14

To the extent that many subscriptions are mediated through libraries, the model to follow
may exaggerate the cost savings from open access. Journals may only need to pay the fixed cost
of processing each library’s account rather than the numerous readers each library may represent.
Still, open access may lead to some cost savings, eliminating the need to negotiate with each library
over price as is done by several commercial publishers and eliminating the cost of processing each
library’s account. Further, open access may be more convenient for readers, saving them from
having to pass through login screens or library gateways. This additional convenience benefit
could be modeled along the lines of reader-cost savings.
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that there is a unique free-entry equilibrium with one active journal and the active
journal adopts open access in this equilibrium.

5.2. Non-Profit Journals
The paper has so far considered profit-maximizing journals. This section takes up
the case of non-profit journals, an important case to consider because non-profits
make up a substantial portion of the journal market, most notably professionalassociation journals. The case is more complicated because non-profits may have
a variety of different possible objective functions, but we can draw out some of the
implications of our analysis so far and can make some additional general points.
Consider the case in which the non-profit journal is a monopolist. Assuming the journal’s objective is to maximize social surplus subject to a break-even
constraint, then the equilibrium would be equivalent to the second-best social optimum analyzed at the end Section 3. Other possibilities include that the journal
is dedicated to open-access and either maximizes profit or social surplus subject
to this constraint.15
One must be careful to distinguish between the profit and non-profit cases to
understand the effect of monopoly power on the pricing regime. In the case of a
for-profit monopolist, its monopoly power can generally be expected to result in
higher markups compared to the competitive case and thus fewer cases in which
a free-submission regime on the one hand or an open-access regime on the other
might be observed. Monopoly power for a non-profit will likely have the opposite
effect. The non-profit can use monopoly rents to subsidize its particular objectives,
whether surplus maximization, zero prices on one or the other side of the market,
etc. If, for example, the non-profit journal is interested in promoting open access,
it can use its monopoly rents to subsidize low subscription fees. Competitive
pressures may reduce the journal’s freedom to pursue particular objectives.
Next consider the case in which a non-profit journal (journal 1) competes
alongside profit-maximizing journals in a free-entry equilibrium. To make the discussion concrete, suppose that journal 1’s objectives are targeted at open access.
More precisely, it maximizes author surplus subject to an open-access constraint
(pR
1 = 0) and a break-even constraint. (The analysis is similar for other specifications of journal 1’s objective function.) Suppose that otherwise journal 1 is
identical to other journals in terms of costs and the value it provides customers.
15

The Public Library of Science (PLoS) journals in biomedicine, founded by Nobel-prize-winner
Harold Varmus, may fit this model.

18

It is immediate that the non-profit journal is competitively viable if and only if
there exists a free-entry equilibrium among profit-maximizing journals (as characterized by Propositions 2 through 4) involving open access. Thus, Proposition 5,
which provides sufficient conditions for open access to emerge in free-entry equilibrium with profit-maximizing journals, also provides sufficient conditions for the
non-profit journal to be competitively viable. It might be argued that the presence
of the non-profit journal may help competitors coordinate on an equilibrium with
an open-access journal if such an equilibrium exists among multiple equilibria.
But aside from this tenuous equilibrium-selection argument, the presence of a
non-profit journal makes little difference in the free-entry context. Competitive
pressures limit a non-profit’s ability to pursue idiosyncratic objectives.

5.3. External Revenue Source
The analysis has assumed that the journal’s only revenue sources are author and
reader fees. In practice, journals sometimes gain additional revenue from a variety of sources including advertising, registration fees for affiliated conferences,
discriminatory fees charged to non-scholar practitioners, a subsidy from the sponsoring society or host institution, or a grant from a foundation.16
We can model this external revenue simply by supposing that journal j has
a lump-sum subsidy that it can use to fund operations. It is immediate that this
subsidy does not affect equilibrium with profit-maximizing journals for any market structure—monopoly or free entry—because lump sums will not affect their
marginal decisions.
A subsidy may affect the second best with a single active journal or, equivalently, the pricing policy of a non-profit monopoly journal dedicated to maximizing
social welfare. A subsidy may affect the viability of a non-profit journal dedicated
to open access in competition against profit-maximizing journals in a free-entry
equilibrium.
Consider the second best with a single active journal, analyzed at the end
of Section 3. The provision of a lump-sum subsidy would tend to reduce the
overall level of both author and reader prices, increasing the range of parameters
for which there is open access in the second best. Consider the viability of a nonprofit journal dedicated to open access in competition against a profit-maximizing
16

Some of these sources are more important in fields other than business and economics, but even
here they are present in some cases (the American Economic Review accepts some advertising, the
Journal of Investment Management uses conference registration fees to subsidize journal operations,
Economics Bulletin relies on in-house computer support from its host university, etc.).
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journal. The provision of a subsidy to the non-profit journal will clearly increase
the range of parameters for which it is viable.17

5.4. Quality Certification
We have so far modeled quality considerations in a relatively spare way. From the
authors’ perspective, a high-quality journal is a widely read one. From the readers’ perspective, a high-quality journal contains many articles. The spare model
provides a useful start because it connects with much of the existing literature on
two-sided markets and provides a simple setting to fix basic ideas. However, a
richer model is needed to capture further quality considerations that are important
for journals. Research is not homogeneous; some articles are better than others.
Given articles are of heterogeneous quality, some mechanism is needed to certify quality. Readers can use this information to economize on reading time by
focusing on the best research or to help weigh the merits of different evidence
and methodologies. Employers can use this information to help judge author talent in hiring, tenure, and promotion decisions. Journals provide this certification
mechanism. Quality certification is more important for journals than many of the
other markets to which the two-sided-market model has been applied, including
telecommunications and credit cards.
In this section, we will modify the model used so far by having articles differ in quality, by having authors benefit from publishing in a high-reputation
journal—where reputation is measured by the average quality of articles published
in equilibrium—and by having readers benefit from the aggregate quality of articles
in the journal.
Formally, suppose author i is endowed with an article of quality qi ∈ [0, q̄].
R A
Author i derives net surplus bA
i Qj − nj pj from publishing in journal j, where Qj
17

External revenue sources may change the game for authors and readers as well. To the extent
that an author can rely on his home institution or grant funder to pay part of the submission fee,
his marginal rate of substitution between readership and fees reflected in bA
i will increase. If the
funder can also dictate the journal to which the author must submit his article, then our original
model applies with the parameters on the authors’ side reinterpreted as reflecting the funders’
valuations. (This possibility is of current policy interest, with at least 23 major international
funding organizations providing line items for increased submission fees according to the website
of open-access publisher BioMed Central, www.biomedcentral.com, downloaded May 30, 2006,
and with organizations such as the U.S. National Institutes of Health debating whether funded
authors should be required to submit to open-access journals.) To the extent that a reader can
rely on his home institution’s library to pay subscription fees, the reader’s parameters need to be
reinterpreted as an aggregation of the underlying demand of the library’s patrons.
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is the average quality of articles published in journal j, which we will sometimes
refer to as the journal’s reputation. The model thus departs from the stark assumption that authors care about the number of readers for the stark assumption that
authors care about a certification benefit independent of the number of readers. In
practice, authors may care about both, but considering each separately simplifies
the analysis. Assuming authors care about certification independent of the number
of readers can be justified by assuming that the certification appears on the author’s curriculum vitae, and the number of people reading the author’s curriculum
vitae may be independent of the number of people reading the journals listed there.
A A
Assume bA
i and qi are random variables with joint distribution F (bi , qi). Reader
R
R
k’s net surplus from journal j is nA
j (bk Qj − pj ). Readers benefit from the total
quality of research in journal j, equal to the number of articles nA
j times average
R
quality per article Qj . As before, bk is distributed according to F R (bR
k ). As before, we take author prices to be per-reader and reader prices to be per-article.18
Journals commit to a quality standard sj , accepting a submitted article if and only
if qi ≥ sj .
Begin with an analysis of the monopoly case. Given monopoly journal j
sets quality standard sj , the average quality of articles published in the journal
implicitly solves
b̄A

q̄

Qm
j =

sj

b̂j
q̄

qi dF A (bA
i , qi )
,

b̄A

dF
sj

b̂j

A

(14)

(bA
i , qi )

A
m
where b̂j = nR
j pj /Qj is the valuation of the marginal author (among those whose
quality meets the journal’s standard) who is indifferent between submitting and
not.
Comparative statics results are generally ambiguous. Consider the effect of an
increase in the quality standard on the subscription price, ∂pR
j /∂sj . An increase
in sj increases average article quality Qj by cutting off more of the lower tail of
articles. This may increase or decrease pR
j depending on the elasticity of reader
demand with respect to Qj , which in turn depends on F R(bR
k ). An increase in
.
The
direction
is
ambiguous:
fewer
authors
are eligible for
Qj also affects nA
j
A
publication, but more authors with high qi but low bi may be induced to submit
18

Now that authors’ benefits are independent of the number of readers, the assumption that
author prices are per-article no longer makes a difference. We maintain the accounting convention
to preserve the notation from before.
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because of the journal’s higher reputation. The change in nA
j will have an indirect
since
the
marginal
revenue
from
readers
depends
on nA
effect on pR
j
j .
Next, turn to an analysis of free-entry equilibrium. The broad insights from
the analysis of free entry without quality certification in Section 4 carry over to
the case of quality certification. On the one hand, competition for authors drives
the equilibrium toward niche articles that serve the interests of individual author
types. On the other hand, economies of scale in bundling articles together that
arise when cR > 0 limit how refined the partition of author types can be.
The specific results in Propositions 2 and 3 may or may not carry over to
the case of quality certification. If cR > 0, then a finite number of journals will
partition the set of authors types. Since authors’ types are two-dimensional (qi
and bA
i ), the subset of types served by a particular journal need not be, as it is in
Proposition 2, convex. Nor is the nice ordering of author and reader prices from
Proposition 2 necessarily preserved, since a two-dimensional set of types does not
generally have a nice ordering.
If cR = 0, any economies of scale in bundling articles disappears, leaving
only the force toward serving the interests of individual author types. Similar
to Proposition 3, there is a continuum of journals in the free-entry equilibrium,
each maximizing the net surplus of the targeted author type. The details of the
equilibrium are slightly different than in Proposition 3. Given that authors care
about quality certification rather than the number of readers, there can be free-entry
equilibria in which journals earn positive profit. Authors may happen to sign up
with journals that earn a profit from high reader fees that have low readerships.
Entry by another journal with lower reader fees and a greater expected readership
would not strictly tempt the author to jump to the entering journal given that
the author is served in equilibrium by a journal with a quality standard perfectly
matched to his own and at the lowest possible submission price.19 Proposition 7
characterizes the full range of equilibria, zero profit and positive profit.
Proposition 7. Assume cR = 0. In all free-entry equilibria of the qualitycertification model, there is a continuum of journals, with each quality qi served
by a different journal or journals.
19

If, in addition to caring about certification, authors care slighly about number of readers,
say having lexicographic preferences over quality certification first and readership second, then
free-entry equilibria with positive journal profits would be eliminated, and only the one with low
subscriber fees and zero profits would remain.
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Case (i): If the following inequality is satisfied for some pR
j ,
R
A
[1 − F R (pR
j /qi )](pj − c) − c ≥ 0,

(15)

then there exists a free-entry equilibrium in which a journal charges pA (qi ) =
0 and pR (qi ) equal to any pR
j satisfying (15). Profit for journals of quality
qi is given by the left-hand side of (15) and may be positive. All authors of
quality qi submit regardless of bA
i .
Case (ii): If (15) is not satisfied for any pR
j , then prices in the free-entry equilibrium satisfy


R
pR (qi) = argmax [1 − F R(pR
(16)
j /qi )](pj − c)
pR
j ≥0

pA (qi) = c − pR (qi ) +

cA
.
1 − F R (pR (qi )/qi )

(17)

Journals of quality qi earn zero profit. Authors of quality qi and value for
certification
bA
i ≥


1
[1 − F R(pR (qi )/qi )][c − pR (qi )] + cA
qi

(18)

submit their articles.
One contrast between Proposition 7 and its analogue without quality certification, Proposition 3, is that the relevant author type targeted by journals is qi rather
than bA
i . A journal or journals serving type qi cannot further tailor their offerings
to suit only particular bA
i types within that quality category. A policy of attracting
authors
within
a set of authors of quality qi —say by charging a lower
low-bA
i
author price—would also attract high-bA
i authors. Varying the reader price does
A
not help target bi types because authors do not care directly about the number of
readers.

6. Conclusion
We analyzed equilibrium in market structures ranging from monopoly to free entry.
The monopoly case is relevant if it is thought that reputational capital or complex
bundling strategies used by incumbents are sufficient entry barriers to afford the
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journal some market power. A monopoly journal would typically charge markups
over marginal cost to both sides of the market, resulting in both significant submission fees and subscription fees, unless there is considerable asymmetry between
the two sides. If, for example, the reader benefits dominate author benefits, either
because there are many more readers than authors or because the given number
of readers gain a high benefit per article read, then the monopolist will lower
submission fees to attract more authors and extract more revenue from readers.
In the extreme case, the monopolist will adopt a free submission policy. On the
other hand, if author benefits dominate reader benefits, the monopolist will shade
subscription fees down, adopting open access (free subscriptions) if the asymmetry
is extreme.
At the other extreme, the nature of the free-entry equilibrium hinged on the
value of the fixed cost of serving a reader, cR . This result is important given that
new digital technologies may reduce this cost, in some cases to zero. If cR = 0,
there are no economies of scale in journal operation. The stringent competition
to sign up authors leads to the entry of a continuum of journals, each precisely
targeting a different author type by offering a submission-fee/subscriber-base bundle that maximizes that type’s surplus subject to a break-even constraint for the
journal. This maximization does not necessarily result in a journal’s offering free
submission, because some author types may be willing to pay more for a journal
with lower subscription fees and thus more readers. Indeed, journals targeting the
authors with the highest benefit per reader bA
i may offer open access and relatively
high submission fees, as we saw in the example in Figure 2. If cR > 0, there are
economies of scale in journal operations in that bundling more articles together
in fewer journals saves the duplication in the cost of serving readers cR . The
free-entry equilibrium in this case involves a finite number of journals partitioning
the author types. The first journal serves the highest value authors with the highest author prices but lowest reader prices; the next journal serves the next lower
interval of author types with a lower author price but higher reader price, and so
on.
We analyzed an extension in which articles differ in quality and authors care
about being certified by a journal that publishes articles of high average quality
rather than the number of readers. The most interesting results emerged from
an analysis of how the addition of quality certification changed the free-entry
equilibrium. With authors having a two-dimensional type (article quality as well
as value of publishing), the partition of author types in the cR > 0 case with a finite
number of active journals is more difficult to characterize. If cR = 0, however,
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we can precisely characterize free-entry equilibrium as involving a continuum of
journals, each targeting a different article quality qi .
Non-profits are important players in the journal market, and we devoted a
section to their analysis. Regardless of its idiosyncratic objectives—maximizing
readership, maximizing the surplus of affiliated scholar members, etc.—a nonprofit journal can exploit any market power it has or any other source of rent such
as an external grant, advertising revenue, or cross subsidy from another activity to
pursue its objectives. The more stringent the competition it faces, the less likely
it can remain viable while pursuing its idiosyncratic objectives.
Our model provides a framework that can be extended to further capture the
complexity of the journals market and to treat new policy issues that arise as the
market matures in the digital age. For example, future work could derive a dynamic extension of the model endogenizing incumbent journals’ market power. In
such an extension, an incumbent’s market power could derive from its monopoly
over the digital archive of its past issues or from lags in the adjustment of reputation. New policy issues that might be analyzed using the model include the
welfare effects of allowing publishers to negotiate with libraries over large portfolios of journals, raising antitrust concerns relating to both bundling and price
discrimination. Second, publishers have begun experimenting with complicated
pricing schemes, including ones that offer the author the option to pay extra for
open access. The welfare effects of such schemes, as well as the implications for
equilibrium under various market-structure assumptions, could be studied using
our framework. Third, free access to articles on authors’ personal websites and
repositories of working papers such as SSRN and arXiv raise questions about readers’ and libraries’ willingness to pay for access in the near future. Our framework
could easily be applied to pricing under such an open-access contraint.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Let Πj be the profit of an active journal j in the
free-entry equilibrium. We will show Πj = 0. Of course it cannot be the case
that Πj < 0 in equilibrium because j can guarantee itself zero profit by setting
sufficiently high prices that it gets no author or reader demand.
We are left to rule out Πj > 0 in equilibrium. As a preliminary step, we
establish several consequences of Πj > 0. First, note that at least one of the prices
R
A
R
pA
j , pj is positive or else Πj ≤ 0. Furthermore, nj , nj > 0 or else Πj = 0.
Rearranging equation (1),
R A
R
A
R R
Πj = nA
j [nj (pj + pj − c) − c ] − c nj .

(A1)

It is evident that the term in square brackets in (A1) is positive if Πj > 0:
A
R
A
nR
j (pj + pj − c) − c > 0.

(A2)

Dividing (A1) through by nR
j , we see that
A
R
R
nA
j (pj + pj − c) − c > 0

(A3)

since cA /nR
j ≥ 0.
With these preliminaries in hand, we will show that if Πj > 0, an inactive
journal can profitably deviate by entering and undercutting journal j’s prices.
A
R
R
Let pA
d = max(0, pj − , 0) and pd = max(0, pj − ) be this entering journal’s
A
A
R
deviating prices. By construction, pd ∈ [0, pj ] and pR
d ∈ [0, pj ]. Take  > 0 to
A
R
R
be sufficiently small that either pA
d ∈ (0, pj ) = ∅ or pd ∈ (0, pj ) = ∅. (Note that
A
R
A
R
either (0, pj ) = ∅ or (0, pj ) = ∅ because either pj > 0 or pj > 0.) Let nA
d and
A
A
R
R
A
A
be
the
entering
journal’s
demands.
Since
p
≤
p
and
p
≤
p
,
n
nR
d
d
j
d
j
d ≥ nj
R
and nR
d ≥ nj . We have the inactive journal’s profit from this deviation is
R A
R
A
R A A
R
R
Π d = Πj + ΔA
d [nd (pd + pd − c) − c ] + Δd [nj (pd + pd − c) − c ]

(A4)

A
A
R
R
R
where ΔA
d = nd − nj and Δd = nd − nj . We will show that if Πj > 0, the
second and third terms of (A4) are non-negative for sufficiently small  > 0,
implying that Πd > 0. To sign the second term of (A4), note ΔA
d ≥ 0. Further,
A
R
A
(p
+
p
−
c)
−
c
can
be
made
arbitrarily
close
to
the
left-hand
side of (A2)
nR
j
d
d
R A
R
A
for sufficiently small  > 0, implying nj (pd + pd − c) − c > 0. But this last
R
R A
R
A
inequality implies pA
d + pd − c > 0, in turn implying nd (pd + pd − c) − c ≥
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A
R
A
R
R
nR
j (pd + pd − c) − c > 0 because nd ≥ nj . To sign the third term of (A4), note
A A
R
R
ΔR
d ≥ 0. Further, nj (pd + pd − c) − c can be made arbitrarily close to the leftA
R
R
hand side of (A2) for sufficiently small  > 0, implying nA
j (pd + pd − c) − c > 0.
We have shown thus shown that the entering journal’s deviation is profitable,
implying Πj = 0 for all active journals in equilibrium. 2

The following lemma will be used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. Suppose cR > 0. In a free-entry equilibrium, one active journal cannot
charge both the same author price and reader price as another.
Proof. Suppose cR > 0. Suppose two journals, labeled 1 and 2, are active (so
A
R
R
A
A
nA
1 , n2 , n1 , n2 > 0), charge equal author prices (so p1 = p2 ), and charge equal
R
reader prices (so pR
1 = p2 ). If Π1 = 0 or Π2 = 0, then the outcome cannot be an
equilibrium. So assume Π1 = Π2 = 0.
Before proceeding, we establish a useful fact, (A5). Expressing Π2 as in
equation (A1), noting Π2 = 0 and cR > 0, it follows that the factor in square
brackets in (A1) is positive for j = 2:
A
R
A
nR
2 (p2 + p2 − c) − c > 0.

(A5)

We proceed to show that journal 2 has a profitable deviation, so the posited
outcome cannot be an equilibrium. There are two cases to consider. First, suppose
A
A
A
pA
1 = p2 > 0. Journal 2 can increase its profit by deviating to p̃2 = p2 − 
R
R
for sufficiently small  > 0, holding p2 (and thus n2 ) constant. Intuitively,
undercutting in this way is profitable because it captures journal 1’s authors (and
others besides). Journal 2 earns a positive margin on each author; otherwise it
could not have covered fixed reader costs and still break even in the original
outcome.
More formally, journal 2’s deviation profit is
R A
R
A
R R
Π̃2 = ñA
2 [n2 (p̃2 + p2 − c) − c ] − c n2 ,

(A6)

where ñA
2 is the measure of authors 2 serves as a result of its deviation. Equation
(A6) follows from (A1). For sufficiently small  > 0,
A
R A
R
A
R R
Π̃2 ≥ (nA
1 + n2 )[n2 (p̃2 + p2 − c) − c ] − c n2
R A
R
A
R R
> nA
2 [n2 (p2 + p2 − c) − c ] − c n2 .
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(A7)
(A8)

To see (A7), note undercutting induces all authors that originally submitted to
A
journals 1 and 2 to submit to 2, so 2’s submissions increase to at least nA
1 + n2
(perhaps more if other authors are also attracted by the lower price). Hence
A
A
ñA
2 ≥ n1 + n2 . Moreover, the factor in square brackets in (A6) and (A7) is
arbitrarily close to the left-hand side of (A5) for sufficiently small  > 0. Thus
(A7) holds for sufficiently small  > 0. To see (A8), as argued, the factor in
square brackets in (A7) and (A8) are both positive and arbitrarily close to each
other fro sufficiently small  > 0. But (A8) equals Π2 = 0, implying Π̃2 > 0. We
A
have thus demonstrated a profitable deviation if pA
1 = p2 > 0.
A
Next, suppose pA
1 = p2 = 0. Journal 2 can increase its profit by deviating to
R
A
p̃R
2 = p2 − for sufficiently small  > 0, holding p2 = 0 constant. Intuitively, such
a deviation, by attracting a few more readers, causes all the authors to submit to
journal 2; this jump in submissions increases 2’s profit because it earns a positive
margin on each, as seen in the previous paragraph.
More formally, let Π̃2 be 2’s deviation profit.
R A
R
A
R R
Π̃2 = ñA
2 [ñ2 (p2 + p̃2 − c) − c ] − c ñ2 ,

(A9)

R
where ñA
2 and ñ2 are 2’s author and reader quantities resulting from the deviation.
For sufficiently small  > 0,
R A
R
A
R R
Π̃2 ≥ ñA
2 [ñ2 (p2 + p̃2 − c) − c ] − c ñ2
R A
R
A
R R
> nA
2 [n2 (p2 + p2 − c) − c ] − c n2 .

(A10)
(A11)

A
A
Condition (A11) holds because ñA
2 ≥ n1 + n2 and because the factor in square
brackets can be made arbitrarily close to the left-hand side of (A5), which is
positive by (A5). Condition (A11) holds for sufficiently small  > 0 because
(a) the term in square brackets in (A11) can be made arbitrarily close to that in
(A11), which is positive by (A5); (b) the term cR ñR
2 can be made arbitrarily close
A
in
(A11),
and
(c)
the
leading
factor
in
(A11),
nA
to cR nR
2
1 + n2 , is strictly greater
A
than the leading factor in (A11), nA
2 . This is true since n1 > 0 because journal 1
is active in the original outcome. Hence, we have shown that 2 has a profitable
deviation in all cases, so the original outcome could not have been an equilibrium.
2

Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose cR > 0 throughout the proof. In step 1 of
the proof, we use revealed-preference arguments to show that the authors divide
themselves into the partitions as stated. Two conditions are equivalent to the stated
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author partition: (a) there are no unserved authors above the lowest type served,
A
)
BnA ; (b) each journal j serves a connected interval, i.e., no author in (BjA , Bj−1
is served by a journal other than j.
To prove (a) holds in free-entry equilibrium, suppose author i with value bA
i
A
is unserved and author k with valuation bA
<
b
is
served
by
some
journal
j.
i
k
This cannot be an equilibrium. Author i could strictly benefit by deviating and
A
A
R A
A
submitting to journal j, earning surplus nR
j (bi − pj ) > nj (bk − pj ) ≥ 0. The
second inequality holds because author k weakly prefers to be served by journal
j than not to be served.
To prove (b) holds in free-entry equilibrium, suppose authors i and k are served
by one active journal (without loss of generality labeled 1) and author  is served
A
A
by another (labeled 2), and suppose bA
k < b < bi . A series of calculations will
show that these revealed author preferences are consistent only if journals offer
equal author and reader prices.
The facts that author i weakly prefers journal 1 and  weakly prefers journal 2
imply, respectively,
A
A
R A
A
nR
1 (bk − p1 ) ≥ n2 (bk − p2 )
A
A
R A
A
nR
2 (b − p2 ) ≥ n1 (b − p1 ).

(A12)
(A13)

R A
A
R A
≤ nR
(nR
2 − n1 )bk
2 p2 − n1 p1
R A
≤ (nR
2 − n1 )b
R A
≤ (nR
2 − n1 )bi .

(A14)
(A15)
(A16)

But then

Condition (A14) follows from (A12) and (A15) from (A13). To see (A16), note
A
R
R
(A14) and (A15) together with bA
k < b imply n2 − n1 ≥ 0. But then (A15)
A
A
together with b < bi imply (A16).
Conditions (A14) through (A16) imply
A
A
R A
A
nR
2 (bi − p2 ) ≥ n1 (bi − p1 ).

(A17)

Condition (A17) is consistent with author i’s weakly preferring journal 1 over 2
only if (A17) holds as an equality. But then (A15) and (A16) must also hold as
R
A A
R A
A
A
equalities, implying nR
1 = n2 and n1 p1 = n2 p2 , in turn implying p1 = p2 and
R
pR
1 = p2 . By Lemma 1, the journals’ charging equal prices is inconsistent with
free-entry equilibrium.
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This completes step 1 of the proof that authors divide themselves into the stated
partitions. The author partition establishes the labeling of journals j = 1, . . . , J .
In step 2, we show that readers divide themselves into partitions consistent with
the established labeling of journals. Two conditions are equivalent to the stated
partition: (a) journal j serves all readers above the lowest type it serves, BjR;
(b) journal j − 1 serves strictly more readers than journal j.
To prove (a) holds in free-entry equilibrium requires similar revealed-preference
arguments to those used to prove part (a) of the previous step. We omit the
arguments for brevity.
To prove (b) holds in free-entry equilibrium, note that active journals j − 1 and
R
j cannot serve the exact same number of readers, for then pR
j−1 = pj . Furthermore,
A
A
pj−1 = pj or else the high-price one would have no authors and would be inactive.
A
R
R
But if pA
j−1 = pj , pj−1 = pj , and both journals are active, Lemma 1 implies the
outcome cannot be a free-entry equilibrium.
So suppose j serves more readers than j − 1. A revealed-preference argument
can be used to show that journal j − 1’s authors would prefer to submit to j than
to j − 1 given that authors with lower types prefer to submit to j. It would follow
that j − 1 would be inactive. So j cannot serve more readers than j − 1. This
establishes that (b) holds in free-entry equilibrium.
The final step of the proof of case (i) is to verify the stated ordering of prices.
R
R
R
It is clear that pR
j−1 < pj for all j = 1, . . . , J , because Bj−1 < Bj , i.e., journal
j − 1 serves all of journal j’s readers and more. In order for some authors to
A
prefer to submit to j, required for j to be active, pA
j < pj−1 . Thus author and
reader prices are ordered as stated. 2
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose cR = 0 throughout the proof. Consider an
outcome in which a positive measure of authors M are served by a journal j that
does not maximize the authors’ surpluses
A
A
R R
A
A
nR
j (bi − pj ) = [1 − F (pj )](bi − pj )

(A18)

R
subject to the non-negative price constraints pA
j , pj ≥ 0 and the break-even constraint
R A
R
A
R R
(A19)
nA
j [nj (pj + pj − c) − c ] − c nj ≥ 0,

where (A19) is equivalent to
A
R
A
[1 − F R(pR
j )](pj + pj − c) − c ≥ 0.
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(A20)

R
Then there exists p̃A
j , p̃j > 0 such that
A
A
R R
A
A
[1 − F R(p̃R
j )](bi − p̃j ) > [1 − F (pj )](bi − pj )

(A21)

A
R
A
[1 − F R (p̃R
j )](p̃j + p̃j − c) − c > 0.

(A22)

and
By continuity, for small enough  > 0, conditions (A21) and (A22) also hold for
A
A
A
all author types in an  neighborhood N (bA
i ) = (bi − , bi + ) around bi within
R
measure M. A journal can enter the market, charge prices p̃A
j and p̃j , and make
positive profit equal to the positive marginal profit per author in condition (A22)
times the measure of authors these prices attract, at least the measure of N (bA
i ).
To show that expression (9) is equivalent to maximizing author type bA
i ’s
gross surplus subject to constraint (A20) and non-negative price constraints, note
that (A20) binds at an optimum since lowering either price increases the author’s
surplus, but (A20) is violated if prices are set to zero. Treating (A20) as an
equality and solving for pA
j ,
pA
j =

cA
+ c − pR
j .
1 − F R(pR
)
j

(A23)

Substituting equation (A23) into (A18) gives the objective function in (9). ConR
straining pA
j ≥ 0 in (A23) gives the constraint on pj in (9).
The proof is completed by determining which author types are served. A type
A
bi is served if and only if for the pA
j for which (A18) is non-negative, (A20)
A
is satisfied. For (A18) to be non-negative, pA
j ≤ bi . But (A20) is satisfied for
A
pA
j = bi if and only if (11) holds. 2
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof for set (i) follows from Proposition 4.
To analyze set (ii), suppose cR > 0. We will show that under (12) an openaccess journal can enter, capture type bA and all higher-type authors, and earn
¯
positive profit. As a first step, we will show that if (12) holds, an open-access
journal can profitably enter if no journal is presently serving the market. The
entering journal can charge pA = bA and pR = 0, serve measure 1 of authors and
¯
all readers, and earn bA − cA − cR − c, which is positive by (12).
¯
It remains to show that if some authors are presently served by journals that
are all closed-access, an open-access journal can profitably enter by capturing
the authors from the active journals. The maximum utility that can feasibly be
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provided to a type-bA author solves a problem we will label MAX1:
¯
A
A
max nR
j (b − pj )
¯

R
pA
j ,pj ≥0

subject to

R A
R
A A
R R
nA
j nj (pj + pj − c) − c nj − c nj ≥ 0.

(A24)
(A25)

A weakly higher maximum than MAX1, labeled MAX2, can be obtained by
substituting a weaker condition than (A25). As argued in the proof of Lemma 1,
cR > 0 implies that the margin on authors must be positive for (A25) to hold.
Substituting nA
j = 1 (the highest possible number of authors) into (A25) and
rearranging,
cA
≥
+ cR + c − pR
(A26)
pA
j
j .
nR
j
We complete the derivation of MAX2 by recognizing that (A26) will hold with
equality at an optimum, using (A26) to substitute out for pA
j in (A24), and substiR
R R
tuting nj = 1 − F (pj ). We then have the following representation of MAX2:


)](bA − cR − c + pR
) − cA .
max [1 − F R (pR
j
j
¯
pR
j

(A27)

The Lagrangian associated with (A27) is
A
R
R
R
[1 − F R(pR
j )](b − c − c + pj ) + λpj ,
¯

(A28)

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint pR
j ≥ 0. Taking the first-order
and
rearranging,
condition with respect to pR
j
A
R
R
R R
λ = f R (pR
j )(b − c − c + pj ) − [1 − F (pj )].
¯

(A29)

It can be seen that λ > 0, in turn implying pR
j = 0 at an optimum, if
b A > cR + c +
¯

1 − F R (pR
j )
− pR
j ,
R
R
f (pj )

(A30)

R
which holds for all pR
j ∈ [0, b̄ ] if (12) holds.
We have shown that the solution to MAX2 involves an open-access journal.
Assuming the journal serves measure 1 of authors, it generates the same value in
MAX1 as in MAX2. But since MAX2 is weakly higher than MAX1, the solution
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to MAX1 must involve open access as well. It remains to be argued that the
entrant indeed serves measure 1 of authors. A revealed-preference argument can
be used to show that if the entrant succeeds in capturing author type bA with an
¯
open-access pricing policy, it will capture all higher types as well.
Hence we have shown that an open-access journal can capture measure 1 of
authors and earn non-negative profit. The fact that the Lagrange multiplier λ was
strictly positive indicates that the bA type gained strictly higher utility from the
¯
open-access journal than from any closed-access journal, and so could still be
induced to switch to the open-access entrant even if the entrant charged strictly a
higher author price. But this strictly higher author price would allow the entrant
to earn strictly positive profit, and so we have demonstrated a strictly profitable
entry opportunity. This implies that the free-entry equilibrium must involve an
open-access journal.
To analyze set (iii), condition (13) implies


R R
R
[1
−
F
(p
)]p
j
j
max
(A31)
b̄A > c +

R
R
F (pj )
pR ∈ 0,c+cA /[1−F R (pR )]
j

j

because the right-hand side of (A31) involves a smaller range over which the
maximization is performed than the right-hand side of (13). After rearranging,
(A31) implies
R
R
(A32)
b̄R − c > [1 − F R(pR
j )](b̄ + pj − c)


for all
pR
j

∈ 0, c +

cA
.
1 − F R(pR
j )

(A33)

A
and pR
Substituting bA
i = b̄
j = 0 into the value function in (9) gives the
A
value b̄ − c. This value is higher than if any other value of pR
j satisfying (A33)
R A
is substituted, implying p (b̄ ) = 0. Since the inequality in (A32) is strict,
A
A
pR (bA
i ) = 0 for all bi in a neighborhood below b̄ as well. By Proposition 3, this
neighborhood of authors is served by an open-access journal or journals. 2

Proof of Proposition 7: Arguments along the lines of the proof of Proposition 3
R A
can be used to show that the free-entry equilibrium maximizes bA
i qi − nj pj , the
net surplus of author type (bA
i , qi ) (now a vector type rather than a scalar) subject
R
to non-negative price constraints pA
j , pj ≥ 0 and a break-even constraint for the
R A
R
A
A
journal nA
j [nj (pj + pj − c) − c ] ≥ 0. Noting that bi qi is an inessential constant
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R A
in the objective function and making the change of variables p̃A
j = nj pj , the
A
R
maximization problem can be rewritten min p̃A
j subject to p̃j ≥ 0, pj ≥ 0, and
A
R R
R
p̃A
j ≥ c − [1 − F (pj /qi )](pj − c).

(A34)

The solution depends on which constraint, p̃A
j ≥ 0 or (A34), binds first, which in
turn depends on the sign of


R
/q
)](p
−
c)
,
(A35)
min cA − [1 − F R(pR
i
j
j
pR
j ≥0

where (A35) is the minimized value of the right-hand side of constraint (A34). If
(15) holds, then (A35) is non-positive, and constraint p̃A
j ≥ 0 binds before (A34).
A
Free-entry equilibrium thus involves p (qi ) = 0 and any pR
j that satisfies (A34)
with 0 substituted in the left-hand side. If (15) does not hold, then pA (qi) can be
found by treating (A34) as an equality with pR (qi ) set to minimize the right-hand
side. Dividing p̃A (qi ) through by 1 − F R(pR (qi)/qi ) gives the value of pA (qi ) in
the statement of the proposition. 2
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